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INTRODUCTION 
The field of international relations has seen a tremendous 
increase in the study and research of international crises. The 
interest in these situations has increased the study of decision-
making and the process through which decisions are made. The 
importance of a crisis can increase with its propensity in 
escalating into something much more serious than the initial event. 
Thus the process by which it is handled is extremely important. 
The objectives that a state wants to produce will determine the 
way an international crisis is defined or handled and the process 
by which it is dealt with. Thus understanding the decision-
making process of the crisis will establish the objectives in the 
course of action taken and policy followed (Sullivan 1976). For 
example, under what circumstances will it be possible to solve 
the crisis through a diplomatic solution and when will military 
measures have to be initiated to maintain the state's 
objectives? 
In the theory of Groupthink, its main proponent, Irving Janis 
(1982), maintains that in certain decision-making situations there 
are identifiable characteristics that a group reflects. These are 
situations that exhibit a measure of hi~h cohesiveness and an 
accompanying concurrence-seeking tendency. These characteristics, 
in turn, will affect the critical thinking of a group. Janis 
stated that there was i n imperfect link between groupthink and 
crises he termed as fiasc oes: 
Simply because the outcome of a group decision has turne-0 
out to be a fiasco, I do not assume that it must have been 
the result of groupth i nk or even that it was the result of 
defective decision -mak ing. Nor do I expect that every 
defective decision , whether arising from groupthink or 
from other causes, will produce a fiasco ... but ... 
Over and beyond all the fam iliar sources of human error 
is a powerful source of defective judgment that arises 
in cohesive groups - the concurrence-seeking tendency, 
which fosters over-opt i mism , lack of vigilance, and 
sloganistic thinking about the weakness and immorality 
of out-groups . (Janis 1982) 
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Janis postulates that there are antecedent circumstances concerning 
a decision-making group that wi ll determine its cohesiveness and 
concurrence- seeking . These preceding conditions consist of internal 
and external stresses that can po tentially produce concurrence-
seeking and lead to the de velopment of the eight symptoms of 
groupthink . The inte r na l stimuli is the preceding structure of 
the group and the re l at ionship of individuals involved: the 
external st imuli i s t he environmental context or situation the 
group is in wh i le mak ing decisions. 
Groupthi nk symp t oms consist of group products and processes 
that re i nforce eac h other. Janis places them in three 
catego ri es : press ures toward uniformity, closed-mindedness, 
and t he over-est i ma tion of the group's power and morality. 
The pressures toward a group consensus, which eliminates 
indivi dual personal arguments in group decision making; (b} a 
shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming to 
the majority view; (c ) pressure applied by the group to those 
few members who showed signs of deviating from the consensus; 
(d) self-appointed mindguards who protect the group from adverse 
information. Close -mindedness involves (e) the incomplete 
analysis of policy implications and (f) stereotyping the enemy 
as inferior for decision-making purposes. The third category 
is essentially a product of the other two and involves the 
overestimation of the group's power and morality. This produces 
(g) a shar~d belief by the group that it was invulnerable, which 
encourages risk taking from a feeling of excessive optimism, and 
(h) the unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality in 
its decision -making . 
When a group takes on a majority of these characteristics, 
the production of poor decision-making will be the result of the 
group's dominance for concurrence-seeking. As Jeanne Longley and 
Dean Pruitt (1980) point out; if groupthink is to maintain a 
purely negative connotation, it needs to be defined as "premature 
concurrence-seeking," since early concurrence-seeking is seen as 
appropriate for rapid integration of ideas into a solution. 
If concurrence-seeking does produce defective decision-
making, it runs the risk that consequences produced from these 
symptoms will be displayed. These include: {l) the inadequ-0te 
survey of the full range of policy alternatives; (2) the 
incomplete survey of objectives that might be affected by the 
chosen policy; (3) the failure to examine risks of initial 
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preferred choice for nono bv ious connotations; (4) the failure 
to exqmine the risks, i ncl uding the benefits and cost of all 
alternatives; (5) the fa ilure to obtain expert information 
concerning the costs and bene f its of all alternatives; (6) the 
selected bias in processing information that does not support 
the initially preferred sol ution; and (7) the improper analysis 
for contingency plans that mi ght be produced from a S€tback in 
the event that known risks mater i alize (see Appendix 1). 
The purpose of this thes i s is to examine if elements of 
groupthink were present in t he decision-making group of the 
Ford Administration dur i ng t he event of the May 1975 Mayaguez 
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and extend analysis on the relationship of the ant€cedent 
conditions infl uenc i ng the decision-making group. The Mayaguez 
incident involved the se i zure of the American merchant ship by 
Cambodian armed force s on the pretense that it was on a spying 
mission . The United States responded initially with diplomatic 
measures t hen quic kly moved with an armed force attack to recapture 
the ship and its crew. The subjects of this analysis are the 
president and the National Security Council with whom the 
pres i dent cons ul te d concerning the U.S. response. 
The Ford Administration immediately categorized the 
military operation as a success. The media took this lead in 
its news coverage placing emphasis on this 11 gutsy 11 move. 
In re trospect students of decision-making are debating whether 
the Mayaguez incident was actually a success or failure in 
foreign policy decision-making. The cost in human life was 
expen?ive, but the national interest concerning our determination 
in Southeast Asia was seen as important to administration 
officials after the collapse of allied governments in South 
Vietnam and Cambodia . The irony of the incident was that 
shortly after the United States launched the attack, the 
Cambodian government had announced that they were going to 
release the ship and crew . 
Though the Mayaguez incident was publicized as being a 
military success, analysts agree (Janis 1982) that this incident 
showed elements of poor decision-making. The focus of this 
research is a belief that an understanding of the external 
stress effe-cting the decision-makers plays a key role in the 
situational context. Thus analyzing the situational context 
is necessary in evaluating the relationship of the antecedent 
conditions in terms of the development of concurrence-seeking 
leading to groupthink. To reiterate, Janis stated: 
I use the term 11 groupthink 11 as a quick and easy way 
to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage 
in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-
group, when the members• striving for unanimity 
override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action ... and refers to a 
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, 
and moral judgment that results from in-group 
press ures. (Janis, 1982) 
In today's w-0rld her~ foreign policy decisions can P.rod4ce 
irreversible ramificat ions it is important to reduce any 
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error in judgment. It is my opinion that understanding the 
development of concurrence-seeking through the antecedent 
conditions of groupthink and reducing these elements would 
produce a conscious effort toward quality decision-making. 
Literature Review 
There are basic inconsistencies in the literature dealing 
with crises and the decision-making process that surround them. 
When a nation-state is faced with a crisis situation its policy-
makers decide on the goals to be achieved, according to valued 
national interests, for the response of the decision-making 
process. By defining the "national interest" of a nation-state 
it forces politicians to be more exact in their actions and 
produces a clearer perspect ive of what objectives have to be 
met. Donald Nuechterlein (1979) has proposed a conceptual 
framework for defining national interest and divides this into 
four basic interests of nation-states: defense, economic, world-
order, and ideological. 
Using these divisions Nuechterlein defines national interest 
as the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in 
relation to other sovereign states which constitute its 
ext~rnal environment. These divisions are: 
1. Defense interests: the protection of t~e nation-
state and its citizens from the threat of physical 
violence by another country, and/or protection 
from an externally inspired threat to the national 
political system. 
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2. Eco nomic i nterest : the enhancement of the 
nation -state 1 s economic well-being in relation 
with other states . 
3. World -order in t erest: the maintenance of an 
international polit i cal and economic system in 
which the nation -state can feel secure and in 
which its citizens and commerce can operate 
peacefully outside t he ir own borders. 
4. Ideological interest : the protections and 
furtherance of a set of values which the 
citizens of a nation - state share and believe 
to be universally good . (Nuechterlein 1979) 
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It is Nuechterlein 1 s contention that the four basic national interests 
outlined above will provide the substance required in describing the 
objectives of nation- states i n the international system. This is the 
desired goal in using the te rm "national interest" and also to 
provide the individual with some form of ability to predict a 
state ' s behavior dur i ng a cr i s is situation. This conceptual 
framework that Nuechterle i n ha s proposed is only a definition; 
the interpretat i on by pol i t ical decision-makers for the nation-
state and its peop l e wi ll determine the interests that are most 
important at a specif i c t i me to produce a response reaction. 
This will then legit imi ze a state's reaction through its 
interpretat i on of des ired goals. 
In dea lin g wi th the process of operationalizing a crisis 
s i t uat ion James Robinson proposed a three- fold concept of crisis 
based on a number of case studies. This preliminary chara-eteriz,ation 
of cri s i s included identi f ication of the origin of the event 
(whether external or internal f-0r decision-makers); time 
available for response (short, intermediate, or long); and 
relat ive impo r tance t o pa rticipants of the values at state (low 
or high) (Robinson 1972) . 
Charles Herma nn' s definition was derived from Robinson's 
conception of internat i onal cr isis as a decisional situation. 
It states: 
A crisis is a situation tha t (1) threatens high-priority 
goals of the decis i on -mak i ng unit, (2) restricts the 
amount of time availab l e fo r response before the 
decision is transformed , and (3) surprises the 
members of the decision -mak i ng unit by its occurrence 
.. . Underlying the proposed de f inition is the 
hypothesis that if al l three traits are present then 
the decision process wil l be substantially different 
than if only one or two of t he characteristics appear. 
(Brecher 1979) 
This definition can become very complex even though it contains 
only three components . For examp le t he ti me response can 
differ due to the nature of a si t uation, where the response time 
for one crisis would be tota l ly inadequate for another. Also 
the time variable wil l di ffer depending on the person or 
persons making the decision. This is caused by the personal 
characteristics of a person or a group. Directly rela ted to this 
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is the perceived threat to goals which was def ined as Nuechterlein's 
conceptual framework of "na tional interest." 
Mi chae l Brecher builds on Hermann ' s def in it ion but differs 
on f ou r essent i al poin t s: t he omission of 11 su r prise 11 as a 
nece ssary condition; the addition of p€ rceived "high probability 
of involveme nt in military hos tilities"; t he replacement of 
short time by 11 f inite 11 time for response; and the recognition 
that the situational change which induces a crisis may originate 
in the internal as well as the external environment of the crisis 
action. Brecher's interpretation states a crisis as being: 
(1) a change in the state's external or internal 
environment which generates (2) a threat to 
basic values, with a simultaneous or subsequent 
(3) high probability of involvement in military 
hostilities, and the awareness of (4) a finite 
time for their response to the external value 
threat. (Brecher 1977) 
This definition emphasized the fact that the crisis actor will be 
responding to the behavior of other actors in the international 
system during crisis decisions thus the concentration is not on 
the perception and behavior of a single state. 
With these two definitions in mind, Leo Hazlewood, John 
Hayes, and James Brownall, Jr. (1977) state, with differing 
definitions, that three distinct orientations toward identifying 
a crisis exist. First, crises have been defined from a decision-
making perspective in studies that probed the behavior of 
individuals and decision-making groups. (This is the basis 
for Irving Janis' groupthink analysis.) The second perspective 
included observed changes in the rate of interaction between 
countries at specific time periods. The third perspective 
contains an important and lasting interuption to the patterns 
and relationships in the international system. Thus, here a 
"crisis" is seen as a change in the international system 
(Hazlewood, Hayes, Browne 11 1977). 
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The basis of this analysis is what Janis called the 
''groupthink" phenomenon. Janis's first study examining this 
phenomena involved the analysis of several foreign policy 
decisions of the American government. He argued that intense 
social pressures toward uniformity and in-group loyalty within 
decision-making groups can build to the point where they 
seriously interfere with both cognitive efficiency and moral 
judgment. Groupthink occurs when independent critical analysis 
of the problem facing the group assumes second place to group 
members' motivation to maintain the group's solidarity and to 
avoid creating disunity by expressing unpopular doubts or 
opinions. 
In several case studies of major foreign policy decisions by 
the American government, Janis attempted to trace the effects 
of social pressures toward groupthink on decision-making. He 
selected for analysis cases in which he felt the signs of poor 
decision-making resulted from concurrence-seeking. Janis 
hypothesized that if certain administrative or structural 
conditions were present it would facilitate the occurrence of 
groupthink during a decision-making situation through the 
psychological structural faults of the group. 
The structural faults which Janis believed facilitate 
groupthink are (1) the cohesiveness of the decision-making 
group, which would include the relative importance of belonging 
to the group and the desire to remain a member of it {thi s 
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implies working together over an extended and continuing basis), 
(2) the insulation of the group, which does not allow for expert 
advice from outside the group; (3) the lack of an impartial 
leadership, thus using power an d in fl uence to alter the 
decision -making process of the group; and (4) lack of norms 
requiring methodical procedures for dealing with the decision-
making tasks. 
Matie Flowers (1977) did a study concerning two critical 
variables that were included i n Janis' hypothesis. It 
involved an experiment to test group cohesiveness and leadership 
style as independent variab l es t hat are involved in the 
decision -making process of groups. Flowers used 120 undergraduate 
students in a laboratory experiment to test Janis' hypothesis. 
In the experiment 32 upperc lassmen were trained by Flowers and 
used as group leaders and instructed to conduct meetings 
according to two l eaders hip styles: 
1. Open style - In line with prescriptive hypotheses 
about prevent i ng groupthink. (a) The leader did 
not state his own suggested solution until all other 
members had t he opportunity to offer their preferred 
solution s . (b) The leader asked for and encouraged 
discussion of each suggested course of action. 
(c ) The leader stated at the beginning and again 
about 10-15 minutes into the discussion that the 
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most importa nt t hing was to air all possible 
viewpoints to reach a wise decision. 
2. Closed sty l e - (a) The leader stated his own 
preferred solution at the beginning. (b) The 
leader stated at t he beginning and repeated 
after 10- 15 minutes t hat the most important 
thing was for the team t o agree on its 
decision. 
Flowers' findings showed t hat leadership style was the most 
important variable in the expe ri ment. Groupthink appeared in 
both high- and low-cohesive grou ps. It is a characteristic of 
Janis' work that cohesiveness in the group is a prerequisite 
of groupthink. Fl owers admitted that the operati6nalization 
of cohesiveness for the exper imental groups was quite different 
from those of dec i sion -mak ing groups in foreign policy. 
It is not cl ear in Flowers' experiment whether the group 
leaders have the ability to alter the decision-making process. 
In foreign pol i cy groups t his legitimated power has been 
established over a long -standing relationship and individual 
persona l it i es ha ve inf luenced the process of group norms that 
have evolved or initi ally taken place. Flowers stated that 
Jani s ' t heory might need to be revised where the level of 
cohesiveness was a critical independent variable, but Tetlock 
(19 79 ) said that it was impossible to take such a step when 
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there was such ambiguity present in the operationalization 
of a fundamental aspect of the study. 
What was significant in Flowers' findings was that the 
difference in leadership style produced a difference in the 
number of proposed solutions . The closed leadership style 
produced fewer proposed solutions and fewer facts introduced 
in the discussion than the open leadership style. This follows 
logically since the leader initially proposed the preferred 
solution and discouraged the discuss ion of other suggested 
solutions. 
Tetlock's own study applied standard content analysis 
procedures to statements of key decision makers involved 
in the groupthink and nongroupthink crises Janis examined. 
Tetlock stated that the similarity here was significant because 
of the two different ways the data was processed (public 
statements versus the retrospective accounts of observers and 
participants) . His content analysis consisted of techniques 
to assess the quality of thinking in public speeches made by 
the president of the United States and the secretary of state. 
Tetlock's findings showed that when elements of groupthink were 
present the co ntent of their public speeches involved in these 
s i t uations we1e seen as simplistic and showed significantly 
lower scores of cognitive complexity than for the nongroupthink 
decisions. 
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Longley and Pruit t (1980) critiqued Janis' theory and 
suggested that the def i ni ti on of "groupthink 11 as concurrence-
seeking produced a pure ly negative interpretation. It was their 
opinion that in routine probl em-solving situations, early 
concurrence -seeking in the sense of rapid integration of ideas 
into a solution is proba bly quite appropriate. Thus a negative 
meaning of groupthink requ ires the definition of "premature 
concurrence -seeking•• (Long l ey and Pruitt 1980). 
Janis 1 rebuttal to thi s argument was that the circumstances 
involved around groupthink-dominated decisions are quite 
different from the poten tial ly positive effects of concurrence-
seeking that they sugges t ed . The problem exists when in the 
final stage of decis i on -mak ing, after all the essential stages 
for proper decision -mak ing have been completed, the vigilant 
decision-maker i s likely to present what he feels is the best 
solution or al ternative in a biased fashion (Janis 1982). 
By exami ning the available literature on the event of the 
May 1975 Mayaguez incident and the reactions produced from the 
Ford Admi ni strat i on, i t is my purpose to ascertain if Janis' 
analys i s of symptoms of groupthink is deficient and to extend 
on his ass umption of purely psychological involvement leading 
to groupthink. As Janis states: 
... my purpose is to describe and expla~n the 
psychological processes that are at work, rather 
than to establish historical continuities . .. 
The central theme of my analysis can be summarized 
in this generalization, which I offer in the spirit 
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of Parkinson' s laws . The more amiability and esprit 
de corps amo ng the members of a policy-making 
group , the greate r i s the danger that independent 
critical t hinki ng wi l l be replaced by groupthink, 
which is like ly to result in irrational and 
dehumanizing act i ons directed against out-groups. 
(Janis 1982) 
An added dimension of interest lies here surrounded by 
the ambiguity of the succes s or failure of the Mayaguez incident 
following the armed milita ry as sault by the United States. 
Methodo logy 
When examining the methodol ogy in a study like groupthink 
analysis it must be taken in t o account that the information 
that would be ideal for analyz i ng the groups dynamics of the 
decision -makers is usual ly not available. Information such 
as detailed notes from meet ings and personalities involved 
within the context of the gro up are unavailable either because 
they have been classified (such as CIA intelligence reports) or 
they do not exist . Some in formation that Janis was able to use 
in his study such as retrospective accounts that were recorded in 
memoirs or declass i f i ed minutes of the meetings were not available 
in analyzing the Mayag uez incident. 
Though t he nature of the Mayaguez incident did not produce 
i nforma ti on tha t Ja nis was able to use, there was a great deal 
of in formation available on the subject. Information available 
included a United States Air Force publication, ''Fourteen ~ours 
at Koh Tang, 11 which documented the decision and proc€dures that 
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were involved i n the military rescue; a report from the 
Compt~oller Ge neral ' s off ice to the subcommittee on International 
Political and Mi l itary Affairs, Committee on International 
Relations, House of Represe ntatives; and information provided by 
the departments of State and defense. Also available were 
transcripts from interv i ews taken during the time of the 
incident with Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James 
R. Schlesinger, and articles that generally describe the 
major characters and circumsta nces involving their relationships 
and personalities . 
With methodological content in mind I can state that this 
analysis, as in Janis ' analysis, is limited to examining the 
decisions that were implement ed and analyzing them in the 
context of their env i ronment . As Janis stated: 
For purposes of hypo thesis construction - which is the 
stage of i nquiry with which this book is concerned -
we must be wil li ng to make some inferential leaps from 
whatever historica l cl ues we can pick up. (Janis 1982) 
It is the importance of the environmental historical ~ontext 
that I believe is understated in Janis' analysis. Its 
influence as an exte r na l sti muli affecting the psychological 
process of t he decis i on-ma king group is undoubtedly important 
to groupth in k. 
A critici sm of Tetloc k's was that groupthink inalysis was 
defi cient in sci enti f ic experimentat ion. He proposed that 
errors can be made from the distortion of retrospective 
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accou nts from ind i vidual s who were involved or arbitrary 
cr i teria in the dec i sion to include or exclude data (Tetlock 
1979) . Tet l ock's cr i t icism is unsubstantial. While it is 
very possible for retrospective accounts to be incomplete or 
deficient in order to make an individual appear better or 
worse, it is highly unlike ly and improbable that the flavor and 
circumstances surroundi ng a decision-making group's dynamics 
and relationships will be hidden, altered, or doubted. 
To emphasize , this analysis of the Mayaguez incident will 
be examined by documented decisions made by the president and 
the National Security Co uncil. Analysis will be established 
concerning the implementat ion of the decisions made and from 
available information of the documented sources and recorded 
data on major indiv i dua ls and circumstances surrounding their 
relationships. In th i s context I would not consider the 
interpretat i on or construction of analysis information in any 
way arbitrary or de ficien t , as Tetlock suggests. 
The med i a covered the Mayaguez incident as a success 
when it was cl ea r that there were conflicting f acts and 
circumstances in es t ablishing this categorical result. In 
analyz ing the Mayaguez incident, we know from evidence in the 
Air Force report, "Fourteen Hours at Koh Tang, 11 that the 
res cue operation of the Mayaguez crew was actually a stroke of 
luck produced by haphazard realities that caused casualties. 
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The Air Force, by documenting the Mayaguez incident, supports 
these facts and White House officials at the time stated in 
The New York Times that during the planning and decision-
making process the outcome was not known in terms of a success 
or failure in rescuing the crew. 
In the Mayaguez incident there were clearly internal and 
external stimuli affecting the decision-making group. Janis 
refers to these stimuli as antecedent conditions consisting of 
two types : structural faults of the organization and provocative 
situation context . It is my purpose to extend the examination of 
18 
the elationship of the antecedent conditions leading to groupthink -
specifically the relat1onsh1p between the internal and external 
sources of stimuli and their effect on individuals in the 
decision-making group . In analyzing the external sources of 
stimuli this thesis will have to examine the historical 
environmental situation leading up to and including the Mayaguez 
incident and to what extent it affected the internal psychological 
process of the decision-making group. 
The environmental situation would provide us with the 
ability to examine what, if any, role it played in the decisions 
made by the group. Conditions involved in the Mayaguez incident 
are good candidates for situational context analysis but not 
every situation will be affected by external stimuli and even 
if it is present, there is no assutance that gtoupthin 
occurred exclusively because of it without examination. The 
exami nation of the relationship involving internal and external 
stimuli and their effects on contributing to groupthink symptoms 
provided a much more comp l ete analysis in establishing whether 
groupthink was a factor in the decision-making process of the 
Mayaguez incident and other incidents where external stimuli 
exhibited potential i nvolvement in analysis. 
The Dec i s i on -Mak ing Group 
The National Security Counc i l (NSC) initially was an advisory 
group that reviewed foreign pol icy issues and provided the 
perception toward developing t he formal processes for foreign 
policy planning and decisions . The NSC evolved and established 
itself as the presidential fo reign policy staff providing 
support for presidential dec isi on It is limited to a formal 
membership of four - the president, the vice president, the 
secreta y of state an d t he secre t ary of defense. However, at the 
time of the Mayaguez incident, advisors to the group included the 
assistant to the presi dent for national security affairs, the 
chairman of the jo in t chiefs of staff, the director of the · 
Central Intell igence Agency (CIA), and (since 1975) the Directot 
of t he arms contro l and di sarmament agency (Destler 1977}. 
Durin g the Mayagu ez incident there were four meetiMgs held 
by the National Security Council over a three-day period, May 
2- 14. President Ford met with this group of advisors that 
flu ctua ted between 10 and 14 members. fhe first meeting was 
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held approximately seven hours after Washington received notice 
of the seizure and i ncluded Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, 
Secretary of State He nry Kissinger (who acted in his other role 
as assistant to the pres ident for national security affairs), 
the department of state was represented by Deputy Secretary of 
State and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (who was fired 
by the president in November 1975). The advisors initially 
included the Director of the CIA William Colby (who was also 
fired by the president later that year ) , Deputy Secretary of 
Defense General David Jones the act ing chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (the cha i rman was overseas at the time), Assistant 
to the President Donald Rumsfe ld (who would soon become the new 
Secreta y of Defense) , Depu ty Assistant for National Security 
Affairs Brent Scowcroft (who would soon become the assistant 
for National Security Affa irs and was considered to be the 
protege~ of Henry Kissin ger). Also present was the Senior 
NSC Staff Off i cer fo r east Asia, Richard Smyser. Other advisors 
who would subsequent ly join the group were councils to the 
president : Joh n Ma r sh , Robert Hartmann, and Philip Bu~hen. 
Chief of Na val Operat i ons Admiral James Holloway would also be 
present at t he four t h meeting (U.S. Congress 1976). 
A primary consideration in determining the presence of the 
grou pthin syndrome is unders tanding the relationship between 
t he members in the deci s ion-making group. The president was 
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at the top of the chain of command and was perceived as the 
individual respons i ble for making the final decisions that were 
implanted during the Mayag uez incident. In the everyday procedures 
of the office, Ford's style of leadership was affected by his 
personality and lack of executive experience. Ford let his 
personal feelings and friendship get in the way of disciplining 
his staff; he was much too tol erant for mediocre work and this 
was seen as a major flaw in hi s ma nagerial skills (Wayne 1977). 
Ford's long experience as a United States congressman from 
Michigan was one of working in groups and committees where 
confidence in the decis i on -making process was established during 
meetings. With Ford's famil i ar role as team player he was not 
confident in his position as a decision-maker. Ford liked to 
make decisions during meet i ngs when key advisors were present 
and would ask for a variety of views on a topic to minimize 
the possibility of over l ooking and/ or underrating options and 
their consequences . Once Fo rd's insecurity was eliminate<l 
through the group dec i s i on -ma king process he did not hesitate 
in finalizing dec i sions and having them carried out, and he 
was not afraid of ask ing ques t ions involving decisions and 
the i r consequences . 
Ford' s previous experience as congressional minority leader 
was bas i ca lly a reactionary one. He was adept in coordinat «ng 
t he oppo s ition with short-term perceptibility and during the 
Nixon Administration he was a maj or participant in organizing 
suppo~t for the president . But Ford's previous work provided him 
with little or no experience in forming a coherent and consistent 
program to use as a base for running his election campaign in 1976 
and led to his inability to effective ly administrate the executive 
branch of the government . It was Ford's good image and his strong 
support of the Republican Party that got him appointed vice 
president and not his strength as a leader of the party. It was 
Ford's perceived characteristic of being an ineffective leader 
that led to his demise in the election of 1976 when the people 
decided that they needed more than someone who would restore 
dignity and honesty to the office after Watergate. To illustrate 
Ford's inability to be effective where foreign policy was 
concerned, one White House official who had worked for both 
Ford and Nixon pointed out that, unlike Nixon, Ford approached 
foreign policy on a problem-by-problem basis, while an aide 
stated that Ford did not have any structured world view (New 
York Times 1975). 
Ford, in establishing himself as president, wanted to be 
accessible and he also relied heavily on his senior staff for 
developing policy ideas much more than Nixon had. The president's 
accessibility led to a breakdown in the line of authority, 
producing confusion within the admin istration because it 
resulted in a f lexible system where lines of responsibility 
were not clearly drawn; thus making it much more likely for 
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individuals to assert cla i ms over a particular area to protect 
it from being influenced by other factions in the administration. 
An example of influential asse r tion happening in the Ford 
Administration concerned the appo i ntment of the executive 
director of the domestic counc i l . Vice President Rockefeller's 
interests were in influencing domes tic affairs where he dominated 
the policy direction and operational control of the Domestic 
Council. He wanted his long- time associate James Cannon to 
fill the position. Assistant to the President Donald Rumsfeld, 
who was a friend of Ford's, urged the appointment of Assistant 
Council, Phillip Areeda . Ford sided wi th Roc kefeller and Cannon 
was appointed . Though friendships di d i nfluence the working 
process of the Ford Administrati on, Cannon's appointment 
strongly suggests that Rockefeller ' s control over domestic 
affairs was established to a point where his influence on the 
president concernin g ap pointments was clearly apparent (Wayne 
1977) . 
The unique and most dom inan t character involved in the 
National Secur i ty Co un cil was Henry Kissinger, who has been 
desc ibed as havi ng a "st arring" style produced as much from 
hi s personality as f rom his intellectual and academic background. 
During the period of the Mayaguez incident Kissinger held the 
pos itions of secretary of state and assistant for National 
Securi ty Affairs, which gave him an unparallel ed personal 
dominance as a participant in the decision-making process and 
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also woul d i mp ly an imba lance in the National Security Council 
toward the State De par t ment vis-a-vis other departments involved. 
Clearly , to understa nd t he relationship of the individuals in 
the decision -making group one must understand the individualistic 
and egocentric nature of Henry Kissinger. He was accustomed to 
working with a small group of assistants in the National Security 
Council and was known for hi s inability to consult with other 
high officials in the admi ni strat ion (Gilboa 1976). 
Kissinger's idiosyncrasi es were a major contribution to the 
dismissal, in November 1975 , of Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger . While Ford pr i ded himself as being an accessible 
president Schlesinger foun d i t most difficult to establish 
a relationship and commun i ca te with the president. To reach 
Ford Schlesinge had to go t hrough Kissinger which made it 
difficult, if not impossible , for his to express any 
disagreements that he may have had with the secretary of state. 
Janis describes his pro tective behavior as 11 mindguard, 11 a 
characteristic symptom of groupthink where an individual 
insulates ideas f rom being exposed to the decision-making 
group . Ki ss inger ' s be havior illustrates that mindguard did 
take pl ace du r ing t he Mayaguez incident. The exact purpose 
i s not cer t ain - whether to insu1ate Ford from differing 
ideas or to protect Kissinger's own position as primary 
fore ign poli cy maker. In any event, mindguard was present even 
with Ford's preferred style of accessibility. 
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Kissinger's mindguard behavior was not just isolated 
by the Mayaguez incident : it was an ongoing thing where the 
relationship precipitated Schlesinger to publicly question 
Ford's defense budget and the advisability of the concessions 
that Kissinger was offering to the Soviets at the time concerning 
d~tente and the limitation of strategic weapons (Balfour 1975). 
Ford would later comment ''I need a feeling of comfort with an 
organization: no tension, complete cohesion," and that his 
decision to fire Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was to avoid 
11 growing tension 11 in his administration (Nathan 1976). The 
description here is a classic and primary characteristic applied 
to groupthink and the circumstances surrounding the decision-
making group's relationship can provide some insight to those 
that were involved in the decision-making process of the 
Mayaguez incident. 
Other members in the group included Donald Rumsfeld who 
had developed a close friendsh ip with President Ford when 
they were both members of Congress. During the Mayaguez 
incident his position was essent ially that of chief of staff, 
though officially he was chief personal advisor to the president. 
The importance of his position in the administration would 
soon increase when he replaced James Schlesinger as secretary 
of defense. The important aspect to understand is that his 
effect iveness wou d also increase when Brent Scowcroft took 
over Henry Kissinger's position as head of the National Security 
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Council, leaving Kissinger as secretary of state and limiting 
his direct influence on the president. 
As Nancy Balfour (1975) explains, with Henry Kissinger 
no longer on the president's personal staff, it would be 
more probable that the president would be presented with a 
wider variety of alternatives for foreign policy decisions. 
Rumsfeld shared Schlesinger 's reservations on Kissinger's 
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theory of detente, but would eventually have easier access to 
the p esident to express the view of the defense department. 
Thus it would not be necessary for Rumsfeld to experience 
pressure to compromise as Schlesinger did for the sake of 
political expediency. 
The relationships involved in the foreign policy decision-
making process of the Ford Administration were brought out in 
a New Yo k Times article on May 28, 1975, stating that Ford 
was determined to influence foreign policy more and not to 
rely on Kissinger for his input and primary status in 
establishing U.S. foreign policy. A White House official 
stated , 11 The problem with the NSC from the president's 
point of view is that it is narrowly focused on foreign 
affairs and security. But the president cannot have input 
on foreign policy from people with tunnel vision. Foreign 
policy does not exist in a vacuum. 11 These dominant personal 
relation shi ps are important in understanding the Ford 
Administration, with Rockefeller and Kissinger exerting 
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influence in their respective areas. Also important to remember 
is the fact that Kissinger had established his position in 
foreign policy during the Nixon Administration making it very 
hard on Ford to assert himself. But the relationships were 
essentially allowed to perpetuate because of Ford's character 
and lack of executive experience. Even though Ford was an 
accessible president and wanted to be supplied with a wide 
range of alternatives for decision-making, his easy-going 
personality hindered this process, essentially because he had 
not developed for himself a secure position as decision -maker . 
Background and Context of the Mayaguez Incident 
Prior to the Mayaguez incident the countries of Vietnam 
and Cambodia had fallen as a consequence of a North Vietnamese 
victory . As a U.S. fore ign policy failure, the communist 
victory was a humiliation to the United States and was 
anticipated that there would be a loss of U.S. influenc~ in 
Southeast Asia . In January 1975 President Ford requested 
Cong ess to appropriate $522 million to supplement military 
aid for the countries of Cambodia and Vietnam. At the time 
there was a general anti-Vietnam sentiment in the Congress 
and the appropriations essentially never had a chance of bein 
passed. It was thought that the failure to provide suppol 
for these countries precipitated the communist victor 
took place by May 1975 (Destlel 1977) . 
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Kissinger took these developments personally, because he 
had known that the possib i l i ty of a communist takeover was 
good, but he did not feel that the situation could occur as 
quickly as it did . Kissinger ' s reacti on to the fall of 
Cambodia and Vietnam, and the sus pension of his mission to the 
Middle East in March 1975 , was highly emotional. As the dominant 
foreign policy advisor in the adm i ni st ration it was Kissinger's 
job to interpret signals from unstabl e international areas for 
U.S. foreign policy and predict what wa s to happen. Consequently 
the p emature communist victory over Cambodia and Vietnam caught 
Kissinger when it was clear that his planning for such an 
occurrence was inadequate - leav ing the United States with no 
viable foreign policy pos i tion to follow. 
Also during the time of the Mayaguez incident, decision-
makers remembered the situat i on in 1968 when the Pueblo and its 
crew were seized and Un ited States suffered humiliation in 
Southeast Asia i n the negot iation process. Viewed in this 
light , the seizure of the Mayag uez could be perceived by 
decision-makers as a del ibera te t esting of U.S. will, 
requir i ng prompt and decis ive action. Bu t as the comptroller 
ge nera l 's report points out (U.S. Congress 1976), during the 
t i me of t he Mayaguez incident, the United States di-0 not know 
who controll ed the Cambodian governme nt nor the purpose of the 
act ion s ta ken against the Mayague z . When the communists took 
over, communication had ceased to provide the outside world 
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with accurate informat i on with any regularity or reliability. 
In retrospect , the United States government was not interested 
in the purpose behind the seizure. Indicating this point, one 
defense official believed the th reat against the U.S. government 
was that the United States woul d receive another humiliating 
embarrassment in Southeast As i a . It was felt that another blow 
to United States' foreign po l icy was a potential risk with the 
seizu e of the Mayaguez (U .S. Congress 1976). 
Though information comi ng out of Cambodia prior to the 
seizure was limited, there was su f f icient evidence available to 
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suggest some motivations beh i nd the Cambodian actions. Information 
concerning Cambodian act i ons was avail able at the first National 
Security Council meeting t hat took place approximately seven 
hours after Washington received notice of the seizure. 
P evious knowledge incl uded: 
- Ten days befo re t he seizure a group of Thai fishing 
boats had been se i zed and later released by Cambodia. 
- Eight days befo re t he seizure Cambodian patrol boats 
had fired upon and unsuccessfully attempted to seize 
a South Korean sh i p. 
- Si x days befo re the seizure vessels fleeing from South 
Vietnam and a Vi etnam government craft were seized 
by Cambod ia . 
- Fi ve days before the seizure Cambodia had stopped, 
se ized and searched a Panamanian vessel which it 
re l eas ed about 36 hours later. 
- Five days before the seizute Cambodian authorities 
were focusing attention on the need to control 
ce rtain outlying islands because of possible 
petroleum reserves. 
Three days before the se izure evidence suggested that 
the new Cambodian government was claiming a 90 mile 
territorial limit and planned to seize all foreign 
ships violating such limits (U.S. Congress 1976). 
The above information strongly suggests that the new Cambodian 
government felt it was necessary to show some sign of authority 
to establish legitimation in other country 's perceptions. 
Following the Mayaguez incident, The New York Times reported 
that the Cambodian government's stated purpose behind seizing 
the ayaguez was the belief that it was a CIA spying vessel. 
The Cambodians clai med that previously seized vessels admitted 
to CIA involvement. Upon the U.S. military reaction, the 
Cambodians also stated that they let the Mayaguez and crew go 
because their "weak country cannot have a confrontation with 
the U.S.A." With evidence of the Cambod ian's recent actions, 
it strongly appea s that the frequency in which they occurred 
would suggest a greater possibility of the ship and crew being 
released . 
Diplomatic Measures Toward a Solution 
The Ford Administration received a lot of criticism 
because of its quick decision to mo ve from diplomatic to 
military measures in solving the seizure of the Mayaguez. 
After the first meeting of the National Security Council 
(1:50 p.m. on May 12) a statement was released by the 
president stating that the seiz ure was considered an action 
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of piracy and demanding t he immediate release of the ship. 
The failure to do so wo ul d have the most serious consequences. 
Later that afte r noon a request was made by the State 
Department to the Chinese l ia ison office in Washington to deliver 
a message to the Cambodians . The request was denied and it was 
decided to ma e contact through the U.S. liaison office in 
Peking, where messages were del ivered to the Cambodian embassy 
thee and to the Foreign Min i stry of t he People's Republic 
of China . Early Wednesday morn ing on May 14 the State Department 
found out that the Chinese autho rities in Pe king had returned 
to our liaison office in Peking our intended message to the 
Cambodians . No account or reaso n is given for the Chinese not 
delivering the U.S. message , but it is likely that the Chinese 
commu ists had sympathetic leanings toward the communist regime 
in Cambodia . In any event , t here had been no response to the 
U.S. message that was sen t directly to the Cambodians. 
Followi ng these de vel opments U.N. Ambassador Scali of the 
United States de li vered a let t er on May 14 to U.N. Secretary 
Waldeim request ing ass is t ance in securing the release of the 
Mayaguez an d its crew. The U.N. secretary respon<led by getting 
in di rect communi cat ion with the Cambodians and the United 
States , appealing to both governments to seek a peaceful 
resolve to the Mayaguez incident. Accotding to U.N. records, 
a res pon se wa s not eceived by t he sec etary general from the 
Cambodians until May 19 (U.S. Congress 1976). 
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When asked in an interview on May 16 whether there was any 
chance toward a diplomatic resolution, Kissinger stated: 
There was no chance during this crisis to resolve it 
diplomatically . That is to say, we never received a 
communication - proposit ion - that would have enabled 
us to explore a diplomatic solution, and it was - by 
Wednesday evening we had not yet received any reply 
that the president ordered the military operations to 
begin (U.S. Congress 1975) . 
Approximately three to four hours after U.N . Ambassador Scali 
delivered the U.S . request to the secretary general on the 14th, 
the U.S . issued orders to begin a military assault operation; 
they did not wait for the process of diplomacy to finish before 
initiating a military reaction. 
At 7:07 p.m. on May 14, the Cambodian government broadcast 
a message from the Phnom Penh domestic radio station, saying: 
... (the royal government) will order the Mayaguez 
to withdraw from Cambodian territorial waters and will 
warn it against further espionage or provocative 
activities . This applies to the Mayaguez or any 
other ships like the ship flying the Panama flag 
which we released on May 9, 1975 . 
The Cambodian message followed essentially with their pattern 
of actions prior to the seizure of the Mayaguez, but was 
interpreted in Washington as insufficient to cease military 
assault because the status of the crew members was not 
mentioned specifically . Ironically, the initial White House 
statement on the seizure was referred to only in the context 
of the ship and did not mention the crew spec i fically . 
. . . The President has met with the NSC. He 
considers this seizure as an act of piracy. He 
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has instructed the State Depa rtment to demand t he 
immediate release of the shi p. Failure to do so 
would have the most ser i ous consequences (U.S. 
Congress 1976). 
The Cambodian message was rece ived by wire services in Washington 
at 8:19 p.m. , a few minutes after President Fo rd and the NSC 
received it . According to White Hou se and Pentagon logs, the 
rescue operation had already been underway for about one hour 
with helicopters on the way to the Mayagu ez fro m the airbase 
in Thailand . Due to inaccurate estimates of enemy strength 
the rescue forces encountered hostile fire now forcing the 
continuance of military operations . White Hou se reaction was 
to issue a statement to the Cambodians say i ng that the United 
States would cease military action upon t he release of the crew. 
The release of the crew was taking place , but hasty reactions 
loc 'ed the United States into mi l i tary measures. 
Mil i tary Mea sures Toward a Solution 
The decisions that were ma de concerning the military 
rescue operation were conducted through a military chain of 
command. The president is comma nder in chief of the armed 
forces and makes the ultimate decisi ons on mi li t ary actions. 
He i s adv i sed by the Nat ional Security Council, whose 
operat i onal purpose i s t o provide options and discuss ion 
concern i ng po li cy -mak ing. At t he top of the chain, then, 
i s t he Nat iona l Command Au t hority, consisting of the president 
and the sec ret ary of defense, followed by the Joint Ch iefs of 
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Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINPAC), who have 
planning and operational responsibility for the entire 
military rescue operation of the Mayaguez incident (see 
Appendix 2) . {U .S. Congress 1976). 
Though CINPAC had control over the local command, it 
gave control of the Mayaguez incident to local command in 
developing the rescue operation that took place. What is 
significant is that foreign policy experts and other military 
experts were not involved in the development of the rescue 
operation. Expert information here would have been valuable in 
deciding what type of military procedure was appropriate or 
whether one would be appropriate at all. The involvement of 
more people would have established more debate on the 
development for U.S. actions - but the existence of a true 
debate toward alternatives did not take place during the 
Mayaguez incident. Support here is established by the fact 
that the extra administrat ion advisors and chief of naval 
operations were only present at the last National Securit.y 
Council meeting - indicating the lack of significance 
placed on gathering exper ienced knowledge to contribute 
to the decision-making process. Lack of involvement was also 
exhibited by initial members of the group with the statement 
by the deputy secretary of state's claim that he contributed 
very lit t l e to the discussions that did go on . 
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This is not to say that Washington did not play the 
central figure in the decision-making process, through Ford 
and Kissinger, concerning the military operation . The proces s 
of rapid communications encourages the use of a central control 
over the use of force in any situation. During the Mayaguez 
incident, rapid communications permitted the president to 
decide whether to attack a vessel heading toward the mainland 
which was suspected of carrying Mayaguez crew members, and at 
a later point in the incident , to cancel and then reinstate 
the initial air strikes against Kompong Som. With the use of 
rapid communications it was strongly apparent that the United 
States was not locked into the military assault and that there 
was an option available to recall the initiated rescue operation. 
If the president wanted it so, the military attack could have 
been halted. 
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The military apparatus initiated its part in the Mayaguez 
incident by gathering information through military reconnaissance 
to determine military assets that were required for the operation . 
It was the military that researched the options and recommendations 
for the president to choose from, not the National Security 
Council, foreign policy advisors, or other experts. The 
military operation included units from three sections of the 
U.S. military: the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps . The 
choice of military strategy that was decided on was as follows : 
1. locate the Mayague z, 
2. prevent further mo vement of the ship, 
3. iso l ate Koh Tang to prevent movement of the 
crew or reinforcement of the island, and 
4. retake the Mayague z and re scue the crew 
believed to be on Koh Tang (targets on the 
mainland were bombed to pro tect U.S. forces) 
(U.S . Congress 1976) . 
The Air Force publication , "Fourteen Hours at Koh Tang" 
(Des B isay 1976) gives some insight on how haphazard the 
mi itary operation was and how ineffectual the policy-making 
was with respect to getting the Maya guez and the crew back. 
It as a little over an hour after the military assault 
started that the crew was retur ned wi thout previous knowledge 
of the rescue forces and taken aboard the USS Wilson. The 
return of the crew shifted the whole operation to recovering 
the assault forces that were now on Koh Tang. The situation was 
grim with 130 mar ines meeting heavy resistance, necessitating 
reinforcements i nto withd rawing them from the island. 
Eventually a total of 230 mar ines had to be recovered from 
Koh Tang by he l icopte r evacua tion. Planners of the operation 
had no way to establ i sh a scenario of the outcome prior to its 
imp lementation due to the tremendous unce r tainty and unfavorable 
condi t i ons . The Air Force documentation of the operation 
sta ted t he outcome was not established until the last minutes 
of the operat ion. Cl early the uncetta inty the military planners 
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had must have been expressed to the decision-makers in 
Washington, yet the developments that did take place suggested 
that contingency plans had not been established by the decision-
making group should unforseen circumstances arise requiring the 
operation to deviate from the original plan. In retrospect 
there is no evidence that contingency plans did exist. 
The center of the military operation had then shifted from 
rescuing the crew to getting the assault force off the island 
and it appeared that the events of the rescue operation taking 
place had been operationally planned. In actuality, the Air 
Force attributes the controlled appearance, 11 ••• in the face 
of almost total uncertainty for planners and terribly unfavorable 
conditions fo participating helicopters and marines ... ", 
to their brave, unhesitating character and to their excellent 
training. If it were not for the strong support of U.S. 
Air Force and Navy units during the Marine evacuation on Koh 
Tang it is certain the resulting circumstances could have been 
much worse (Des Brisay 1977). 
. Illusion of Unanimity 
A unanimous feeling can have a decidedly curious effect 
on a group of decision-makers. There is a sense of 
authority the individual feels that justifies the belief in 
the truth of the group. Janis states that the reliance on 
consensual validation tends to replace individual critical 
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th i nking and reality - test ing, unless there are clear-cut 
disagreements among the members (Janis 1982). The Mayaguez 
incident opened up an oppo rtunity for the U.S. government to 
flex its muscles that would produce the desired effect of a 
display of strength. It was made clear three days after the 
seizure of the vessel when De fense Secretary Schlesinger and 
State Secretary Kissinger stated in T. he New York Times that they 
were eager to find some dramatic means of underscoring President 
Ford's stated intention to "maintain our leadership on a 
worldwide basis . " 
During the Mayaguez dec i s ion -making procedure the rescue 
and return of the crew was stated as being the primary objective. 
If the crew's safety was pa ramount, how can a military rescue 
assault be established when t he location of the crew members 
was not known? Logically there was no way to form the basis of 
U. S. actions when information t hat was central to the U.S. 
military operation was not known. Also strongly evident here 
was the knowledge of Cambod ian actions during the previous days 
and weeks l eadi ng up t o t he captu re of the Mayaguez. The 
pattern of act ions disp l ayed gave t he lJni t ed States a very strong 
indicat ion that t he Mayag uez and crew would soon be released. 
If evidence was no t so strong, uncertainty surrounding the 
Mayaguez situation might be considered a variable influencing 
the National Security Council to move quickly from a diplomatic 
to a military solution. But a review of the literature 
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surrounding the Mayaguez incident showed that White House 
off i cift l s actually stated in The New York Times that they 
acknowledged t he Mayaguez incident as a 11 calculated gamble 
with a broad purpose . " If the central purpose had been the 
safe return of the Mayaguez crew, there would have been a 
calculated effort for i ntelligence to find its position. The 
move to act as quickly as the U.S . government did or in such an 
aggressive manner would not have t aken place. When one observes 
that the primary purpose was t o produce a show of force by the 
U.S. government to display to others U.S. intentions in Southeast 
Asia, the line of decis ion-mak i ng becomes clearer to the observer. 
The safety of the crew could not have been the primary concern 
because there would have been dissention in the decision-making 
group as to the risks invo lved re lating to the safety of the 
crew . Unanimity was strongly present with Ford, Kissinger, 
and Schlesinger all emphasizing the U.S. show of force as a 
broad base purpose , an d Admi nistration officials including 
Kissinger and Schlesi nger stated that a means was necessary to 
"mainta i n our l eaders hip on a worldwide basis. 11 
Kiss in ger in a 1962 article on the Cuban missi l e crisis, 
wrote "t hat a grea t power leads not so much by its woros as by 
i ts ac tions , that initiative creates consensus'' (New York Times 
1975 ). Kissinger is describing here qui t e distinctly the type 
of consensus -seeking that was taking place during the Mayaguez 
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incident. The procedure through which the United States 
respo~ded to the Cambodian capture had taken precedent to a 
casua 1 ty-free or mini.ma l -casua 1 ty outcome. 
In terms of a unanimous feeling of the decision-making 
group there is clear evidence that external pressure was 
present on both Ford and Kissinger . The situational context 
that produced pressure on President Ford was coming from his 
election campaign. In order for him to establish himself as a 
11 take charge" decisive leader he had to prove himself. If Ford 
did not project an authoritative image he would have left 
himself vulnerably open to attack by the election opposition if 
he did not prove his leadership capab ilities. The situation 
produced by the capture of a U.S . merchan t ship by a small 
communist country gave Ford the opportun ity to react in an 
aggressive, "gutsy" manner. The reaction described here is 
inherent in human nature - we have to prove ourselves and 
consequently give little thought to the outcome. 
In a structured theory it is not possible to fully 
account for inherent human actions . What is unique about 
groupthink is that Janis makes an effort through his 
antecedent conditions to incorporate human factors and 
variables that will affect decision-making, especially 
where concurrence-seeking tendencies are involved in a group 
process. These antecedent conditions play an integral part 
in groupthi nk where they wi 11 affect the process of concurrence-
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seeking . It i s the react ion of individuals that are produced 
from ~hese antecedent condit ions of psychological pressures 
and situationa l context that will influence the way that a 
person makes a decision . External stress are variables that 
a e deficiently described by Janis in their relationship and 
effects upon the decision -maki ng group. 
To further explain the ex i stence of external pressure 
toward concurrence-seeking invo l ved during the Mayaguez incident, 
Henry Kissinger had just exper ienced some failures involved in 
the developments of U. S. foreig n po licy. Though the president 
is the final decision -maker concerning all aspects of U.S. 
foreign policy, Kissinger, at the t i me of the incident, had an 
unprecedented position as head foreign policy maker. Kissinger's 
recent failures involved Midd le East peace negotiations, the 
lack of congressional support fo r U.S. aid to Southeast Asia, 
emphasized with the unexpected communist takeover of Cambodia 
and Vietnam . These are examples of recent situational contexts 
that placed Kiss inger in a position where he would feel the 
need to produce an i nf l uential situation to counteract some 
of the fa il ures lead in g up to the Mayaguez incident. 
In effect the s i t uat ional contexts described above 
in f luenced both Ford and Kissinger and consequently forced 
t he direc tion of their decision to use a military rescue 
ope rat ion. Their motives were f reely admitted by themselves 
and administration officials in the media. But to compound 
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the external stress on decision-makers, a large source of 
group consensus developed during the Mayaguez incident through 
the external stres s that t he situation itself produced. As 
a source of stress in the dec ision-making group the Mayaguez 
incident changed its goal from the successful rescue of the 
ship and crew to a situation where the procedure of a military 
operation would place U.S. i ntentions on display with the 
distinct side effects of influencing the U.S. position in 
Southeast Asia and the improved image of President Ford as a 
national leader . 
Another example of assumed consensus toward an illusion 
of unanimity was mentioned earl ier. It can be observed in 
the state department ' s input of the decision-making process 
during he Mayaguez incident . The comptroller general's 
report was unable to determine the extent of state's input, 
but a good indication was given by the deputy secretary of 
state. He stated that his role was essentially that of an 
observer and that he contr ibuted little to the discussions. 
From this evi dence it strongly appears that the state department's 
role was li mi ted to one of delivering U.S. messages in 
Was hin gto n, New York, and Peking (U.S. Congress 1976). 
Conj ecture here produced a failure toward any possible 
di plomat i c res olution but also emphasizes that the approval 
di spl ayed in the Mayaguez inc ident was not the approval to 
ri sk t he lives of the crew; that had already become a secondary 
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objective . The approva l displayed was that the United States 
was wi lling to use military measures as a tool to show hostile 
forces U. S. capabilit i es and intentions. 
The source of group consensus developed during the 
Mayaguez incident through the external stimuli the situation 
itself produced, but it was be ing i nfluenced by the external 
sources of stress that was ind ividually affecting Ford and 
Kissinger toward premature concurrence-seeking for a military 
rescue operation . In relati onship to the group the external 
stress of the situational contex t was directly emphasizing 
the psychological structural fa ults of the decision-making 
group, not allowing for a group process toward quality 
decision-making to take pl ace. 
While tacit, if not consc i ous approval is sure to have 
taken place during the four Nat ional Security Council meetings 
prior to the rescue ope rat ion, approval was publicly voiced 
afterward . The influence produced was tremendous and extended 
much further than just the dec ision-making group involved. 
The media heralded the rescue a success and The New York Times 
stated that vi r tua l unani mi ty had been created between the 
co ngress and admini stra tion concerning the return of the 
Mayag uez - something that had not taken place on an issue 
concerning Southeast Asia in a long time. 
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Illusion of Invulnerability 
An illusion of invulnerability is characteristic of a 
feeling of unanimity but it extends further to productive 
measures of the group, taking the form of unnecessary risks 
that are involved in the course of action decided on. The 
acceptance or nondiscussion of risks is also part of what 
Janis called the illusion of invulnerability and contains 
two themes: ( 1) "We are a strong group of good guys who 
will win in the end." (2) "Our opponents are stupid, weak, 
bad guys. 11 (Janis 1982). Janis 1 descri pt i ans here are 
broad generalizations and can be extended. The Mayaguez 
incident produced goals that were stated as being broadly 
based, providing a much greater margin of error and more 
reason to be optimistic. By showing our military strength 
the United States was proving a point and producing a 
situation where decision-makers become overoptimistic concerning 
the successful outcome of the goals involved, specifically the 
United States' image abroad . But a very interesting point 
concerning the optimism of the decision-making group is that 
rescuing the crew was a very emotional issue. It would be 
very easy for the Nationa l Security Council to gain support for 
a quick military rescue when there are hostages endangered by 
cornmun is t captors. Opt i mi srn, Janis points out, is pa rt of th.e 
feeling of invulnerability and correlates with the feeling that 
the military operation was considered "gutsy." 
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To elaborate on the illusion of invulnerability, the 
decis~on-makers ass umed that we had an inherent right to 
the use of Thailand terr itory during the military operation 
when they knew that the Tha i government would be sensitive 
to the issue . When asked by a reporter why the United States 
had not made an effort to con sult with the Thai government 
before we sent in the marines Kissinger stated: 
Well the assumption was tha t we were in an emergency 
situation in which, on occas ion, we have acted without 
having had a dull opportun i ty for consultation, and it 
was therefore thought that within the traditional 
relationship it would be a measure that would be 
understood . In any event i t would have presented 
massive problems either way . 
In retrospect it was easier for t he United States to go ahead 
and use the Thai territory and apologize for the indiscretion 
later as we did . In any respect , the military operation would 
include the use of the Tha i te rritory and consulting with their 
government wou l d ha ve produced more problems and slowed down 
the military operation . 
Here we can observe t he ex istence of the direc t relationship 
that the situat i on produced by the capture of the Mayaguez: it 
affected the dec i s i on-makers• belief that t he United States had 
the r i ght to use the Thai territory without prior permission. 
Co nce rn here was not even directed by repercussions that might 
de velop f rom the United States• actions. In effect Kissinger 
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i s sta ting that the group was feeling an illusion of invulnerability 
due to the situation and classi fying it in terms of an emergency. 
Following this line of thinking the administration 
respo nded to cr it ici sm it receiv€d concerning the president's 
respons i bil i ty t o co nsult with congress before initiating the 
use of U. S. armed forces i n accordance with section 3 of the 
War Powers Resolution. The administration's response was 
basically the same one used co ncerning the use of the Thai 
territory without permission ; tak ing the position that the 
president has certain inherent powers to protect American lives 
and American property . While t he administration did inform 
some members of congress on developments during the incident, it 
did not consult with them . The lack of congressional involvement 
was essentially overlooked as an issue after the incident was 
over, due to the establ i shed outcome and overall approval that 
was exhibited These two i ndi scretions also prove that decision-
makers were very opt imi st ic t hat the potential for them being 
blown out of proportion woul d be defused by the emotional issue 
of rescuing the crew members from capture. 
Due to what the Defense Department called a tactical 
value for a preemptive str i ke, the operation to rescue the 
crew appears to have been unnecessarily hurried and essentially 
increased the r i sks involved. The operation proceeded with 
inadequate in te lligence gathering on the location of the crew 
and expec t ed oppos ition of forces on Koh Tang. "Fourteen hours 
at Koh Ta ng, 11 documented by the U.S. Air Force, indicated 
t his uncertainty: 
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How many were being held, or even if any were held 
there (Koh Tang) was unknown - there had, however, 
been nighttime shuttle runs by Cambodian patrol 
boats between the Mayaguez and gunship crews 
observed personnel movement on the beach during 
the shuttle activities. Although a group of 
personnel was spotted aboard a fishing boat 
heading for the mainland on the 14th, the strong 
possibility that at least some crew members were 
being held on the island could not be ignored. 
Thus the helicopters and marines headed for Koh 
Tang uncertain as to the presence, number or 
whereabouts of the Mayaguez crew members. 
Also unknown was the degree of enemy resistance 
which would be encountered, but preflight 
briefings based on estimates of Khmer communist 
strength at the island indicated the resistance 
should be low. Preparation of the landing zones 
with air strikes was ruled out to preclude 
inadvertent injury to Mayaguez crew members 
who conceivably could be in the landing zone 
areas. Air cover would be available overhead, 
however, should enemy resistance be greater than 
expected. Once the eight helicopters had inserted 
their marines, they, along with the choppers 
flying to the USS Holt, were to return to their 
staging base for a second wave should the extra 
men be required. It was a difficult scenario, 
and one fraught with uncertainties. There were 
not the circumstances a military commander would 
choose for such a rescue mission (Des Brisay 1977). 
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was asked in an interview 
whether the degree of faulty intelligence (the fact that no 
members of the Mayaguez crew were on Koh Tang) bothered him. 
He evaded the question by saying we did not know whether part 
of the crew was on the island or if all the members had been 
moved. This reiterates the fact of inadequate intell1gence 
gathering and that U.S. forces and decision-makers did not know 
where the crew was during the assault, which was central to 
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the military operation, thus forming no basis for U.S. 
actions (U.S. Congress 1975). (See map on page 71 concerning 
movement of crew members.) 
As it turned out it was the fishing boat, described 
above, that transported the Mayaguez crew from Koh Tang to 
the Cambodian mainland then back to a small island off the 
mainland called Koah Tang Sam Learn. It was her€ that the 
crew members remained until their release. Information was 
collected by U.S. pilots but was incompletely passed to 
decision-makers. Although continued reconnaissance in the 
area was direct, the fishing boat was not designated as a 
target of significant interest. Included in poor information 
was the innaccuracy of intelligence - Defense Intelligence 
assembled information on May 12 claiming Koh Tang had between 
150 and 200 Khmer Communist forces on the island that were 
heavily armed. Estimates of the armaments included: 
... armed with 82mm mortars; 75mm recoiless 
rifles; 30-caliber, 7.62mm, and 12.?mm machine 
guns; and 840/41 rocket propelled grenade 
launchers. Also, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency estimated that: 
1. An additional 1,500 to 2,000 Khmer 
communists were in the Kompong Som/ 
Ream area. 
2. There were 24 to 28 Khmer communist 
naval craft armed with 3-inch guns, 
20/40mm antiair.craft weapons, and 
50-caliber, 7.£2mm, 12.7mm machine 
guns. 
3. An unknown number of 23/37mm AAA 
weapons were at known sites at Ream 
Airfield. 
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4. There were a small number of T-28, AU-24, 
AC-47 and delo gunships with unknown 
operational status and locations (U.S. 
Congress 1976). 
Contrary to this, Intelligence Pacific in Hawaii had information 
by May 13 claiming forces on the island were between 90 to 100, 
reinforced by a heavy weapons squad of 10 to 15. 
These two intelligence organizations were supposed to be 
communicating with each other to establish preceding estimates 
for the marine assault forces . The Defense Department claims 
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that the two forces were in communication, but only the information 
from Intelligence Pacific was received by the local command and 
caused Marine personnel to inaccurately estimate the inhabitants 
of Koh Tang at about 100 people, including women and children. 
In actuality, assault personnel estimated that there about 150 
Khmer communists on Koh Tang at the time of the assault. The 
comptroller general's report stated that Pacific command and 
local U.S. command officials felti the risks involved were 
reasonable . It was the report's opinion that no accurate 
estimation of risks could be established with inadequate and 
uncoordinated intelligence such as those observe<l during the 
Mayaguez incident (U.S. Congress 1976). 
It was not until two days later (May 17) that Marine 
of icers in charge of the assault saw correct preassault 
estimates of Khmer communist forces on Koh Tang, which 
supports the critics response that a military assau 1 t was 
initiated too soon. 
... postponement of the operations would have 
permitted additional time to plan the assault. 
Because of the lack of t ime, no detailed 
dperational plan for the Marine assault was 
prepared. A formal assault plan would have 
listed estimated enemy forces, and thus might 
have alerted the local U.S. command to the fact 
that Marine assault planners did not have the 
accurate estimates of Cambodian strength. 
A delay in the conduct of the rescue operation 
would have permitted it to be made in an 
entirely different manner (U .S. Congress 1976). 
If more accurate information had been available, Marine sources 
50 
stated that it would have produced an assault action that was more 
covert in nature, giving them an opportunity to limit risks and 
safely rescue the crew. The decision to proceed with the rescue 
operation goes beyond poor decision-making. The fact that poor 
decision-making existed during the Mayaguez incident is 
evident. Why and how it was allowed to happen are the 
significant questions here, and it is very clear that 
external sources of stress were affecting the decisions made 
thus producing the opportunity for the symptoms of groupthink 
to become established. 
Suppression of Personal Doubts 
There are severa l factors involved in the Mayaguez 
incident that are present to produce a suppression of doubts. 
As we have discerned President Ford was concerned with his 
elec t ion campaign and the problems surrounding his public 
image. Voters had not perceived the president as strong, 
take -charge i ndi vidual who could handle the complexities of 
the office . It is a fac t that the decision made by the 
president to proceed wi t h a military assault was heralded 
by democrats and republicans in congress as a strong display 
of leadership. The question of the lack of decisive leadership 
capabilities was no longer a campaign issue for conservative 
epublicans to contend with when the incident was over and 
overall approval was exhibited. The ending of the Mayaguez 
incident was used as a media hype for the president, and 
attributed to the strong posi tive attitude of the U.S. 
actions that were taken . 
To emphasize the att i tude of a successful operation a 
statement was made for the record by Congressman Larry 
McDonald of Georgia, who was a devout anticommunist. It 
stated: 
I very much ap preci at e the opportunity present this 
statement to the Committ€e on International Relations 
relative to the Maya guez incident. While I understand 
the s i ncere mot ives t hat compel some members of 
Congress to want to re-examine the whole affair, 
I wi ll repeat what I said before the House Armed 
Services Comm i ttee - 'You only conduct an autopsy 
when the pat i ent di es!' So, in my view, it would 
be more appropr i ate t o conduct an autopsy of our 
Vietnam po li cy s ince in that case the patient 
di ed ... we need only to recall the Pueblo 
i nci de nt in whi ch the United States did not act 
promp t ly and decisively. In this case we lost the 
ship, lost one man, had three men wounded, one with 
permanently disabling injuries, to say nothing of the 
humili ating statement we had to sign in haggling for 
t he re lease of out men with a third rate power -
North Korea ... Therefor€, in my view, the only 
thing needed to write finis to this episo<l€ is for 
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Congress to congratula te our Armed Services on the 
dedicat i on, professiona l is m, and bravery that was 
shown in the rescue of our ship and crew (U.S. 
Congress 1976) . · 
The circumstances of the Puebl o incident were considered a 
failure due to the fact the Nor th Koreans kept the crew for 
almost a year, but it must also be remembered that the Pueblo 
was an electronic surveillance sh ip and the Mayaguez was a 
merchant ship. Mortal fatalities i nvolved in the Pueblo 
incident were limited to one compared with 15 killed and 3 
missing in action in the Mayaguez i ncident. Yet the Mayaguez 
incident was considered a succes s where casualties during 
helicopter and ground operat i on were much higher and included 
50 wounded . Clearly the success or failure was not determined 
by the outcome but rather through the procedure. 
In the Mayaguez incident the United States did not have 
to go through any references involving humiliating negotiations 
or wait an extended peri od of t ime for those negotiations to 
take place like in the Pue blo incident. A success through 
procedure could not be estab lished with the United States in a 
position contain ing no leverage. Placing the United St~ tes in 
a position of weakness woul d reflect on our international 
i mage . Thus in t he Mayaguez incident the United States 
chose to eliminate the alte rnative and proceed almost directly 
with the mi l itary re scue operation. Support here is 
es tabli shed with the fact that the military rescue operation 
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had been in i tiated from Thailand territory by helicopter en 
route toward t heir desti nation of Koh Tang island. There 
was approximatel y one hour head start between the start of 
the U.S. rescue operation and the Cambodian announcement 
that they were letting the crew go. There is no record or 
suggestion that the military operation be suspended or 
postponed due to the informat ion - even with the rapid 
forms of communication that di d exi st, making it possible for 
Washington to initiate a quick hal t to the operation. 
Decision -makers can uncons ciously suppress their doubts 
concerning the decisions be i ng made. While Janis emphasizes 
the unconscious suppression of doubts due to internal pressure 
and structure of the dec isi on-ma king group, the transfer of 
priority goals in the Mayaguez incident also transferred the 
pressure to an external source, the maintenance and integrity 
of the U. S. pos i t ion in the world. With the transfer of 
goals conscious doubt of t he initial goal concerning the 
successful rescue of the sh ip and crew was over r idden and in 
turn justified wi th i n t he decision-making group. The 
just i fication of do ub ts was present when the National Security 
Co unc i l mo ved qui ckly fr om a diplomatic solution of the 
Mayaguez inc ident to a military one. Even after tt:le military 
ope rat ion was over the news media clearly reported the res~ue 
as a success and in the next sentence the media talked about 
casualties, inaccurate intelligence information and statements 
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reporting the outcome , for success was not known prior to the 
initiation of the military operation. It was not until the 
Air Force, in documenting the Mayaguez incident, publicly 
announced that there were s ignificant doubts that surrounded 
the military rescue operation. 
Also contributing to the suppression of personal doubts 
was Kissinger's attitude at the time. Clearly, Kissinger's 
personal reaction to the fall of Cambodia and Vietnam to 
communist influences contributed to his strong, if not 
domineering, influence on the deci sion-making group and 
contributing to internal psycholog ical stress. In this 
context, Kissinger was asked by a reporter on May 16, 1975, 
to what extent the U.S . opera ti on played a part in the 
restoration of American credib i l i ty or morale. His reply was: 
The thrust of our discuss ions concerned the recovery 
of the ship and the rescue of the men. If there were 
any byproducts - that can be considered a bonus to 
the operation , but it was not the principle impetus 
behind the operation . We believed that we had to 
draw a line aga i nst il l egal actions and, secondly 
against situations whe re the United States might 
be forced into a hum ili ating discussion about ransom 
of innocent merchant seamen. If it had these 
byproducts - I th i nk t o some extent it did have 
this effect . But th is was not the pr imary motivation 
beh i nd the action (U .S. Congress 1975). 
On the same day Kis s inger wa s quo t ed in The New York Times 
as saying t hat he believed that the demonstration of American 
dete rmination in the Mayaguez inci de nt would have at least 
a marginal impact on the Russi ans showing them that we wer. 0 
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not weak or indecisive. U.S. actions, Kissinger felt, would 
indicate to them not to take risks that could worsen the 
international situation. It is interesting to note, in 
retrospect to Kissinger's answer on the Mayaguez incident, 
that there is no account or threat of account concerning 
ransom demands made by Cambodians for the Mayaguez and its 
crew. Also, in the comptroller general's report to congress, 
it stated that the military assault on the Cambodian mainland 
had no influence on the Cambodians returning the crew; the 
captors were already in the process of releasing them. 
Clearly these indicators establish that the United States was 
more interested in projecting a message to the international 
community rather than producing a situation where a maximization 
of assurance would return the Mayaguez and its crew without 
incident. 
Personal attitudes can establish a source of stress for 
the decision-making group as Janis (1982) describes producing 
a time pressure on the group thus forming a basis to quickly 
move from diplomatic measures to military ones in the 
absence of substantial intelligence that would justify quick 
action. According to the groupthink hypothesis, once stress 
is felt in the group effective decision-making will decrease 
because of concurrence-seeking through group cohesion. During 
crisis decision-making when high stress is a factor, the 
tolerance for ambiguity is reduced and as a result 
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individuals are more wi l l ing to make decisions before adequate 
information is ava i lable thus increasing the risks involved. 
In the case of the Mayaguez incident ambiguity was present 
in the press coverage but I do not believe that it existed 
within the decision -mak i ng group - the pressure toward 
exhibiting a national strength was paramount here. Risks 
were a significant factor i n t he Mayaguez incident with the 
clearly inadequate and inaccura te intelligence information 
exhibited . The concern for r is ks can be overshadowed by the 
combination of stress and uncertainty and thus lead people 
to feel that "the worst wou l d be better than this" (Holsti 
1978) . This asserts that the pressure of external stress on 
decision -makers was higher t han the threat of repercussions 
that might be produced from r is ks in the decisions that were 
made, thus becoming an intri cate factor when analyzing the 
antecedent condi t i ons of groupthink. 
As a res ul t of stress, the search for information and 
options may be adverse ly affected in different ways. According 
to Jan i s, stress , as a contr ibuting factor of groupthink, 
i nvolved pr imar il y the stereotyping of the adversary (1982). 
In t he Maya guez incident the adversarial group Wis described 
as t he communist in f iltrators who had taken over Cambodia and 
acted as pi rates in sei zing the ship. References like these 
were made by Ford and Kissinger in public statements and 
interviews. What is very sign~fi cant here is the whole 
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purpose of the rescue operation was based on the generalization 
of the communist opposition involved. Reference generalizations 
I 
surrounded the Mayaguez incident and led decision-makers to 
further state that the purpose of the rescue operation was 
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broadly based, producing an even broader simplistic generalization 
and establishing an ambiguous nature to the goals of the Mayaguez 
incident for public consumption. These generalized simplistic 
terms did not allow for any alternative motives to be 
established, especially with the information on the Cambodian 
government's actions of the past several days prior to the 
Mayaguez incident. (Note that Tetlock's theory states that 
public speeches involving groupthink observe simplistic terms 
and have lower scores for cognitive complexity than for non-
groupthink decisions.) 
Conclusion 
It can be stated unequivocally that the evidence 
supporting the presence of groupthink during the Mayaguez 
decision-making process is overwhelming, leading the 
members of the group to proceed with a rescue attempt in 
light of insufficient intelligence and feeling invulnerable 
and superior to a small unorganized communist opposition. 
It i s my assertion that the nature of the Mayaguez incident 
itself perpetuated the development of groupthink and was 
reinforced by external stress that was individually 
influencing Pres ident Fo rd and Secretary of State Kissinger 
in ev~nts leadi ng up t o t he time of the incident. 
An examinat i on of events preceding the incident and 
the incident itself is important, and the relationship on 
how they influence decis i on-makers is crucial in analyzing 
the decision -making process . During the Mayaguez incident 
the influence exhibited by Ford and Kissinger on the 
decision for a military rescue operation was directly 
produced from the external pressure placed on them in the 
situational context . Even wi th recent failures in foreign 
policy a conscious effort was not t aken during the Mayaguez 
incident to decisively analyze t he decisions that were to be 
made - but rather t he capture of the Mayaguez and crew was 
used as a statement to counteract t hose recent failures, 
focusing the goal of rescu ing the ship and crew to one of 
displaying U.S. s trength and intentions in Southeast Asia in 
an aggressive ma nne r . 
Central to groupthin k is the cohesiveness of the group 
toward concurrence - seek ing. Due to the relatively short time 
period cover in g t he Maya guez incident it is not possible to 
asce r ta in i f t he cohesivenss of the group was strong enough 
t o main ta in individual loyalty over an extended period of 
t i me , as exhibited by Johnson's group during the 1ong 
escalation of the Vietnam war. But as established earlier, 
decision-making in the Ford administration was iRfluenced 
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through different factions within it. In respect to the 
Mayag~ez incident, it is possible to inductively piece together 
that cohesion did exist during the decision-making process -
it was produced by way of default from the lack of contributing 
debate by other members and domination of the decision-making 
group exhibited by Ford and Kissinger. Circumstances strongly 
indicate that concurrence-seeking by way of the psychological 
structure of the group was influenced strongly from Henry 
Kissinger's position, in what Janis would describe as a 
sycophantic attitude toward his insulation of influence 
surrounding U.S. foreign policy. 
Another development is observed here in groupthink. Janis 
observed the cohesiveness of the group being developed over a 
long or extended period of time. In the Mayaguez incident the 
primary source of concurrence-seeking developed out of the 
situational context. Thus one of Janis' primary variables, 
cohesiveness of the group members, can be applied to new 
decision-making groups or ad-hoc group and not just those 
groups where relationships have already been developed. 
What is significant in terms of understanding the impact 
of groupthink is the complacency displayed by the Dther group 
members - especially with the knowledge of recent Cambodian 
actions. A logical conclusion in light of Dverwhelming 
evidence of recent weeks prec€ding the capture of the Mayaguez 
59 
would have been to include an option to wait and examine the 
developments surround ing t he i ncident. No evidence exists 
that the option to wa i t wa s even brought up in the National 
Security Council (NSC) meeting or the initiation of other 
options of a l ess aggress i ve militaristic nature. 
What the relationship of an tecedent conditions displayed 
was that the decision to cons ciously proceed with a military 
rescue operation created an external situational context 
that influenced Ford and Kiss inger as the primary decision-
makers. The stress on these t wo men led the other members 
of the group to be influenced by the psychological structure 
of the group and promoted the characte r istic development of 
groupthink. Ev i dence here i s so strong because the decision 
on how to respond to the capture was not made through debate 
in the NSC, but throug h Ford and Kissinger's response to 
external stress developing premature concurrence-seeking. 
What prec i pitated t he development of groupthink was that 
Ford and Kissinger's perceptions of external stress on them 
was greater than re percus s ions of their decisions created by 
the incident . In effec t, t he low level of th reat perceived 
by Ford and Ki ssinge r f rom the Cambodians compared to the 
exte rnal s tress of improving Ford's public image and the 
Uni ted Stat es' position in the wor ld produced premature 
concur rence-seeking. The devel-0pment of premature concurrence -
seeki ng then corresponds with Longley and Pruitt's (1980) 
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evaluat i on toward a negat ive connot ation. The examination of 
events , l eading up to a deci s ion-making situation through the 
antecedent condit i ons i n groupthink theory assists in explaining 
the development of premature concu rrence-seeking, thus 
describing the development of the central variable of groupthink 
through the situational context . 
In a decision-making group where the situational context 
is the main antecedent condition producing stress on the members 
the intensity of an external stress affecting the gro~p is very 
important. The external stress du r i ng the Cuban Missile Crisis 
parallels with those of the Mayag uez incident very closely. 
Decision-makers felt the U. S. posi tion in the world could not 
sustain the presence of Sov iet missiles so close to our shores 
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and President Ken nedy ' s pub li c image was also an issue at that 
time. As the nat i onal leader , Kennedy could not subject the United 
States to an even t t hat could endanger the national security and 
subject his dec i s ion-mak ing abilities to criticism. But as 
recounted by individua l s i n that decision-making group, the 
external stress produced by t he situation itself was intense. 
The nature of the t hreat produced a situation where complacency 
of group members was not a problem, but rather the threat of 
esca l at ion t o a nuclear confrontation stimulated debat€ and 
noncurrence-see king. In effect, as Janis {1982) describe~ 
t he intens i ty of stress totally destroyed any feeling of 
unanimity or invulnerability that might have been felt by the 
group . Kennedy also took precautions against the psychological 
structural faults that the group might have had by verbally 
discouraging its development . 
In the escalation of Vietnam (Janis 1982), external stress 
was not initially present on the decision-making group as a 
whole. Personal stress was be i ng pl aced on Johnson during the 
Vietnam war, since he was continua l ly being reminded that he 
could not be the first U.S. president to lose a war. But as 
the time period extended over several years external stress 
became present, affecting the group i n the form of public 
opinion against U.S. involvement . With the increasing unrest, 
complacency of group members began eroding away, causing 
individuals to question the decis ions being made. Defection 
within the group was produc i ng commonplace and caused 
individuals to lose the i r position as group members. 
Here we had a situat i on where the evolution of the 
situational context produced external stress on the decision-
makers and slowly changed the initial psychological structural 
faults of the group. Co nsequent ly, wi t h t he increase in the 
external stress of publi c opinion, group members were 1eaving 
and be in g re pl aced quie t ly . But even with membership defection 
t he co hes ion of the group was s t ill being maintained due to the 
strength of t he psychological s t ructure. While the externa~ 
stres s was strong it was not intense enough to decrease the 
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concurrence- seeking tende ncies of Johnson's group until early 
in 1968 when the president gave the order to halt the bombing 
of North Vietnam in a conc iliat ory gesture toward peace. 
Longley and Pruitt (1980) , i n their critique of groupthink, 
state that they cannot substant iate that stress can be a factor 
in the development of groupth i nk . They cite the examples of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis whe re there was extreme stress and 
little existence of groupthink . Al so, the Japanese attack of 
Pearl Harbor, exhibiting the to t al lack of preparation and 
anticipation by the United States , where groupthi nk symptoms 
were present with a very low leve l of external stress of 
antecedent conditions between structural faults of the 
decision-making group and the situational context of the 
environment. 
Pearl Harbor was a classi c example of a group structure 
that reinforced itself towa rd a very strong feeling of 
unanimity and invulnerabi li ty (Janis 1982). Reassurance in 
these areas produced low leve ls of stress on decision-makers 
even though intel l igence i Aformation was indicating the 
potential for an attack by t he Japanese. Pearl Harbor was a 
situat ion where t he antecedent conditions were limited to the 
psychologi ca l st ruc t ure of the decision-making group. Thus 
exte rnal stres s in the situational context did not become a 
vari abl e i n in f luencing the development of groupthink. 
63 
As just described , the level of stress placed on 
decision -makers by the Cuban Missile Crisis actually 
prevented the development of groupthink. While Kennedy's 
image and the United States' in fluential position in the world 
were issues of external stress , the stress of nuclear 
confrontation that the situationa l context produced was of a 
nature that essentially made other sources of external stress 
insignificant. Hence, we had a si tua tion where the quality 
of decision-making was sought after due to the extreme level 
of external stress involved . 
In the Mayaguez incident the opposite was true; the lower 
level of external stress that the situation produced intensified 
the deficiencies of the group instead of correcting them. 
These deficiencies were present in the group and especially 
visible th ough the biased l eadership produced from premature 
concurrence -seeking and the t otal lack of proper procedures 
within the group toward qua lity decision-making. 
Janis stated that even i f the policy makers had not 
indulged in groupthink, t he policies followed might have been 
the same because of pol i t i cal, idealogical or eco nomic values 
held by dec i s i on-makers (1982 ). Thus the elimination of 
symptoms of groupthink does not mean the elimination of poor 
deci sion-mak ing but would be a s t ep toward quality decision-
mak ing. 
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Improving the qua l ity of decision-making by 
eliminating certain sources of error that 
prevent a group from achieving its goals can be 
expected to have good social consequences for 
policy-making groups that have good goals. 
(Janis 1982) 
The Mayaguez incident was an excellent example in showing the 
relationship of the situationa l context as the main influence 
toward groupthink . In analyzi ng t he external stress we can 
observe that the nature of the s tress affected the decision-
makers toward premature concurrence-seeking, reinforcing the 
psychological structural fa ults of the group. The awareness 
of the relationship between antecedent conditions can assist 
members of a group that the s i tua tional context can in-Oeed 
influe ce the development of groupthink. 
The outcome of the Mayag uez incident will most likely 
maintain a positive connotat i on as a result of its general 
approval but the decis ions that were made and the policy 
produced had no part i n t his outcome. The objectives of 
rescuing the crew and shi p were overshadowed by the objectives 
of a national interest. That interest, in turn, was influ€nced 
by the personal att i t udes of decision-makers. In terms of 
quality decis i on -mak in g t he outcome of the Mayaguez incident 
cannot be interpreted as a success but as a failure that 
could ha ve potenti all y become a disaster. 
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Theoretical Analysis of Groupthink 
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APPENDIX 2 
U.S. Military Chain of 
Command During Mayaguez Incident 
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APPENDIX 3 
Whereabouts of Mayaguez and Crew 
(Source: 
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